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1. Introduction
In the year 1996, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) established standards for how individually identifiable health
information is received, maintained, and stored in electronic form for any given
healthcare organization. In the year 2009, the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act also set standards, implementation
specifications and other criteria for the maintenance of Electronic Health Records
(EHR) [2]. At the time of HIPAA’s creation, the healthcare industry was
transitioning from a paper based information system to an electronic information
system. Health records were being transformed into a digital format, and the
industry began to rely heavily on the use of electronic systems to conduct
business [3]. Prior to HIPAA, there were no security or privacy rules defined for
the protection of a patient’s electronic healthcare information. HIPAA created two
important guidelines. The first rule, ‘the Security Rule’, warranted that entities
(health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, healthcare providers who transmit any
health information in electronic form) must ensure the confidentiality, integrity,
and availability of all electronic protected health information (e-PHI) they create,
receive, maintain or transmit. This includes identifying and protecting against
reasonably anticipated threats to the security (or integrity) of the information, and
protecting against reasonably anticipated, impermissible uses or disclosure while
ensuring compliance by their workforce [4]. The second element created, ‘the
Privacy Rule,’ assuring that the information maintained within one’s electronic
health records are kept secret while flowing from one healthcare entity to another.
More specifically, if a patient’s electronic health records are disclosed, the
individually identifiable health information (i.e. a patient’s past, present or future
physical or mental health) should not be associated with the individual [5].
Despite these efforts by the federal government, a survey by the Ponemon
Institute in 2010-2011 found that there has been a severe lack of security
countermeasures [6]. The Ponemon Institute found 60% of healthcare providers
had severe critical security breaches in the past two years. Moreover, the average
breach cost healthcare entities over $2 million each. The United States
Department of Health and Human Services [7, 8] also discusses and identifies the
increased trend of security breaches in this area. Furthermore, half of the
healthcare entities that were interviewed revealed they had little faith in their
information technology (IT) personnel to protect patient’s data. This report
suggests an alarming situation and needs immediate attention by the industry.
Efforts to learn from other IT fields on how to provide security and privacy
measures have proven that there is a lack of completeness in the tool sets
available to the healthcare industry.
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Therefore, we aim to achieve four goals while developing our tool set:


Comprehensiveness: The tool set needs to be comprehensive enough to scan
the entire domain of an information system. It not only needs to detect
misconfiguration on servers (i.e. database servers, web servers, email servers,
etc.) and network devices, and find missing patches on hosts, but it must also
have the capability to detect vulnerabilities within new and upcoming services
such as VOIP (e.g. eavesdropping) and virtual infrastructures (e.g.
misconfigured virtual networks and virtual hosts).



Automation: Any comprehensive assessments take time to complete, and if an
IT professional has to do one manually, it can take substantial time to
complete the task. Moreover, a manual, comprehensive assessment of a
Healthcare Information System (HIS) can be long and tedious. IT
professionals performing the assessment may skip steps in the assessment to
save time and resources. By automating a comprehensive assessment,
healthcare IT professionals will save time and resources. Likewise, they will
be confident in their assessment results.



Health IT Compliance: Our third objective is ensuring our derived assessment
tool set will provide Health IT compliance in regards to ‘The Security’ and
‘The Privacy’ rule.



Mitigation Strategies: Finally, we aim to achieve mitigation strategies with
complete assessments. Our mitigation technique will differ from current
techniques in that our strategy will be real-time and automated rather than
offline and delayed.

By integrating the above goals into our derived tool set, we aim to address the
security and privacy concerns of healthcare entities and to restore faith in their
electronic information systems. Hence to achieve the goals of this research we
will do the following:


We will survey commercial and open source tools in the areas of
networks, databases, applications, and infrastructure security. We will then
identify the best-fit open source tools to be integrated into a tool set.



When the best-fit open source tools have been identified, we will then
build the comprehensive, assessment tool set and modify it to meet federal
compliance of security and privacy regulations in the healthcare industry.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj/vol4/iss1/6
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After all the applications have been installed, we will write scripts to
automate the vulnerability assessment and penetration test for a typical
HIS.



Finally, after the vulnerability and assessments have been completed, we
will provide a real-time, automated analysis of the logs, and provide
guidance on how to mitigate risk within the HIS.

As the healthcare industry is rapidly moving towards electronic based
information exchange, it has become mandatory for it to be compliant with the
HIPAA, the HITECH Act, and other federal regulations and standards. This
change towards electronic based information systems also requires the industry to
maintain the privacy of patient information. Today’s healthcare industry has
experienced numerous instances of breach of information and the loss or
compromise of critical patient data. According to the Ponemon Research Study,
92% of all healthcare institutions report they have experienced data breaches in
recent years. If entities within this industry do not address this problem
sufficiently, then it might lead to severe federal penalties along with patient
privacy compromises and patient dissatisfaction.
The remaining parts of this paper are split into eight more sections. First, we
will discuss the research that is already being done in this field. Then we present
our survey results from commercial vendors and open source organizations. In
section four we will detail a risk assessment framework for the healthcare
industry. Then we outline our evaluation environment and how we plan to
evaluate our open source solution against a competitive commercial product. We
will then present how our analysis and detection engine operates and how
mitigation strategies are recommended. Finally, we will present the conclusion
and future directions for this research.

2. Background
Over the years there has been a considerable growth in the availability of
automated vulnerability assessment solutions to assess an organization’s
information system. In fact, there are several solutions from commercial vendors
that provide automated vulnerability and penetration testing software. Yet, none
of these solutions offer industry specific compliance testing right out of the box.
Most vendors require organizations to buy plug-ins in addition to their product to
automate industry specific compliance testing.
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Even though the area of automated assessment is quite mature, there is still a
dearth of automated approached for assessment. However, two most current open
source vulnerability assessments do meet some of the goals of our research. Those
tools are OpenVAS 4 [10] from the OpenVAS organization and Fast-Track [15]
from Offensive Security Ltd. Relating OpenVas 4 to our research; we see that it
has a comprehensive scanner used to inspect remote hosts and attempts to list all
the vulnerabilities and common misconfigurations that affect the host. This tool
can be used to comprehensively scan a network as well as server configurations.
Yet OpenVas 4 is not fully automated and does not scan a HIS right out of the
box. A healthcare IT professional must configure the scanner to scan a HIS for
HIPAA compliance. If the scanner is configured correctly (to scan for HIPAA
compliance), then the OpenVAS 4 tool will ensure a HIS is acting in accordance
with the Privacy and Security Rules set forth by HIPAA. Additionally, it can be
configured to list the vulnerabilities associated with each device/service that it
scans, but the tool cannot provide any mitigation strategies for the vulnerabilities
found. Likewise, the tool Fast-Track is an automated penetration suite designed to
scan and penetrate databases, networks, infrastructures, and applications on an
information system's domain. However, this tool’s scanning capabilities is not as
comprehensive as OpenVAS 4—it cannot scan wireless networks or VOIP
infrastructures. Similar to OpenVas 4, the tool does not satisfy the Privacy and
Security Rules defined by HIPAA. Additionally, Fast-Track does not list
vulnerabilities detected or provide mitigation strategies after it has finished its
assessment.
There are numerous policy guidelines on how to keep healthcare entities
HIPAA compliant, but there is a lack of implementation solutions (tool sets) on
how to provide compliance in practice. Additionally, there is little work, if any, in
using an automated assessment tool set for finding vulnerabilities in a typical HIS
and provide mitigation strategies.

3. Survey of Tools
In this section, we identify the tools and their capabilities in regards to assessing
the four security areas of a HIS. These areas include Database Security, Network
Security, Infrastructure Security, and Application Security. First, Database
Security ensures that the designed tool set will be able to crawl, and/or use an
SQL Injection attack on an EHR database to obtain information on patients (i.e.
billing information, social security numbers, type of Healthcare insurance the
patient has, etc.). The second area, Network Security means the tool set must be
able to scan IP ranges of devices on a network and try to identify the operating
system, manufacturer and model. Furthermore, it needs to provide the results from
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the scanner(s) with minimal false positives, and offer exploits available from the
scanner results. The third security area, Infrastructure Security implies that the
tool set needs to deliver client side endpoint attacks to test the infrastructure
(operating systems security and services reliability). Finally, for the fourth area,
Application Security, the tool set must offer application testing in regards to
endpoint attacks on applications (buffer overflows, cross site scripting attacks,
etc.). Additionally, the derived tool set needs to be comprehensive enough to
provide the capabilities for various types of assessments.
The first assessment, External Network Vulnerability Assessment Testing,
involves finding unknown vulnerabilities from outside a HIS’s network through
poor network design and backdoors. One should not be able to access private
areas of the HIS from outside the network. If there is a vulnerability detected, the
tools set will try to penetrate the network in order to prove data can be accessed.
The second assessment, Internal Network Vulnerability: Assessment Testing deals
with finding unknown vulnerabilities from inside a HIS’s network. The tool set
will assess the electronic assets (EHR database, application servers, file servers,
web server, etc.) of the HIS, and if there is a vulnerability detected, the tool set
will try to exploit the vulnerability in order to prove data can be accessed or a
service can be degraded.
The next assessment, Web Application Assessment Testing, ensures the tool
set will test web applications by simulating attacks to gather information on their
flaws and vulnerabilities. More specifically, the tool set will need to test for the
following types of vulnerabilities (but not limited to): cross-site scripting, SQL
injection, input validation, and buffer overflows. In the fourth assessment, DialIn/RAS Security Testing, the task includes testing dial-in/remote access entry point
connections that employees or healthcare partners use and identifying exploits
that can be used against the system. In the following assessment, DMZ or
Network Architecture Designs/Reviews, the tool set will verify data stores are not
located publicly or in the DMZ. Furthermore, an adversary should not be able to
bypass the firewall by piggybacking off a connection from a mail server located
outside the internal network.
Wireless Network Assessment Testing incorporates the capability for the tool
set to be comprehensive enough to detect misconfigurations in wireless access
points and exploit them if vulnerabilities arise. Additionally, if enough packets are
analyzed, the tool set will try to crack the WEP and WPA-PSK keys. In Virtual
Infrastructure Security Assessments we see the tool set identifying and mitigating
virtual infrastructure risk by checking the configurations of virtual machines,
networks, and storage mediums. For the next capability, Server Configuration
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Reviews, the tool set will review common network service misconfigurations,
local password policies, file shares, and file share permissions. Firewall and
Router Configuration Reviews ensures the tool set will check a HIS’s network
perimeter to ensure each firewall is properly configured in order to allow verified
network traffic into the HIS's network. In addition, VPN Configuration Reviews
will verify a VPN is configured correctly and there are no vulnerable entries into
the network. A hacker should not be able to view sensitive information flowing
from location to another. Finally, for Voice over IP Assessments, the tool set will
be analyzing a HIS's network to see if it is vulnerable to the following
vulnerabilities: SIP-based phone call on eavesdropping, and SIP-based phone call
hijacking.
The results from our commercial tools surveys are detailed in the table 1-1
and 1-2. Included in the table is how each vendor’s solution’s capabilities
contribute to the goal of our research. In table 1-1, the commercial tools survey,
we could infer that eEye Digital Security’s Retina Enterprise Edition is the best
choice. We found Core Impact Pro was not a vulnerability scanner, but rather an
automated penetration tester solution that records successful and unsuccessful
attacks and generates vulnerability reports based on those penetration tests.
Therefore, Core Impact Pro may miss a vulnerability that a vulnerability scanner
may be able to detect. In addition, we discovered Retina Enterprise Edition could
also perform penetration attacks using a built in hacker module [9]. Moreover,
Retina and Core Impact Pro could be configured to assess for HIPAA compliance
(Security & Privacy Rules); however, each vendor charges extra fees to provide
this functionality.
As far as the other tools in this survey, we found that they were not as
comprehensive as Retina or Core Impact Pro. WebInspect is geared strictly to
finding vulnerabilities in web applications; Foreground Security did not offer any
products, but rather vulnerability assessment and penetration testing services. As
far as SAINT, information was rather scarce. We did not find as much
information on SAINT as with Retina. Comparing the two solutions we were
more confident with Retina's Enterprise solution. Additionally, Retina's solution
was the highest rated network vulnerability assessment scanners in the industry.
Furthermore, our results from the open source survey are listed in table 1-2.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj/vol4/iss1/6
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Tool
eEye Digital Network Scanner
Retina Enterprise Edition

Database
Database
scanning

Network
External network
vulnerability
Assessment
Internal network
Assessments
Wireless network
assessments
VOIP Assessments
Network
architecture
Designs
Firewall
Configuration
Reviews

Infrastructure
Server
configuration
reviews
Virtual
infrastructure
security
assessment

Applications
Web application
scanning

HP WebInspect
HP WebInspect performs Web
application and Web service security
testing and assessment of complex web
applications. WebInspect also provides
automated penetration tests.
http://www8.hp.com/







Web application
scanning

Core Impact Enterprise Edition
An automated security testing and
measurement solution that can be used
to continuously assess the security of an
organization’s Web applications,
networks, and client-side weaknesses.
The product does not scan for potential
vulnerabilities, monitor for incidents, or
model threats. Instead it replicates realworld attacks against systems and data,
using the same offensive techniques that
hackers employ to find and exploit
weaknesses and expose critical data.
http://www.coresecurity.com/
Nessus

Database
penetration
testing

External network
penetration testing
Internal network
penetration testing
Wireless network
assessments
VOIP Assessments
Network
architecture
Designs



Web application
scanning

Database
scanning

External network
vulnerability
Assessment
Internal network
Assessments
Wireless network
assessments
VOIP Assessments
Network
architecture
Designs
Firewall
Configuration
Reviews

Server
configuration
reviews

Web
Application
Scanning

eEye Retina Network security scanner
identifies known and zero day
vulnerabilities to protect an
organization’s networked assets. The
Retina Scanner supports security risk
assessment and regulatory audits.
http://www.eeye.com/home

Tenable’s Nessus is an agentless, active
vulnerability scanner that performs
vulnerability scanning and analysis
(including Web application scanning,
via a plug-in), as well as compliance
checking, asset discovery and profiling,
configuration auditing, and sensitive
data discovery.
http://www.tenable.com/
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Tool
Saint Enterprise Edition
A toolkit designed for vulnerability
scanning, assessment, and validation on
various targets including network
devices, operating systems, databases,
and desktop applications. The SAINT
toolkit not only identifies vulnerabilities,
but also ways to mitigate those
vulnerabilities. In addition, the toolkit
can exploit vulnerabilities to
demonstrate the scope of damage done
by vulnerability.
http://www.saintcorporation.com/

Database
Database
penetration
testing

Network
External network
vulnerability
Assessment
Internal network
Assessments
Wireless network
assessments
VOIP Assessments
Network
architecture
Designs

Infrastructure
Server
configuration
reviews

Applications
Web application
penetration
testing

Table 1-1 Commercial Tools Survey

Database

Network

Wapiti
Wapiti is an open
source and web-based
tool that scans the web
pages of the deployed
web applications,
looking for scripts and
forms where it can
inject data. It is built
with Python and can
detect:
1) File handling errors
2) Database, XSS,
LDAP and CRLF
injections.
3) Command execution
detection.
This tool can be used to
scan the databases as
well scan web
applications for
vulnerabilities.
http://wapiti.sourceforg
e.net/README
SQLMap
SQLMap is an open
source penetration
testing tool that
automates the process
of detecting and
exploiting SQL

OpenVAS 4
OpenVAS Security Scanner
is a security auditing tool
made up of two parts: a
scanner and a client. The
scanner, openvassd is in
charge of the attacks, while
the client OpenVAS
interfaces with the user. The
scanner, the most critical
part, inspects remote hosts
and attempts to list all the
vulnerabilities and common
misconfigurations that affect
the host. This tool can be
used to scan the network as
well as the server
configurations
(infrastructure) of an
organizations health
information system.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj/vol4/iss1/6
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Kismet
Kismet is an 802.11 layer2
wireless network detector,
sniffer, and intrusion
detection system. Kismet
will work with any wireless
card which supports raw

Infrastructure

Application

OpenVAS 4

OpenVAS 4



Wapiti
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injection flaws and
taking over of back-end
database servers. It
comes with a broad
range of features, from
database fingerprinting
to fetching data from
the DB and even
accessing the
underlying file system
and executing OS
commands via out-ofband connections.
Needless to say this will
aid in fingerprinting and
exploiting a database.
https://svn.sqlmap.org/s
qlmap/trunk/sqlmap/
Wfuzz [19]
Wfuzz is a tool for
brute forcing Web
Applications, it can be
used for finding
resources not linked
(directories, servlets,
scripts, etc),
bruteforcing GET and
POST parameters for
different kinds of
injections (SQL, XSS,
LDAP, etc.),
bruteforcing form
parameters
(user/password),
fuzzing, and more.
http://www.edgesecurity.com/wfuzz.php
http://code.google.com/
p/wfuzz/downloads/list

Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2015

monitoring (rfmon) mode,
and (with appropriate
hardware) can sniff 802.11b,
802.11a, 802.11g, and
802.11n traffic. Kismet also
supports plugins which allow
sniffing other media.
http://www.kismetwireless.n
et/download.shtml

Aircrack
Aircrack is a suite of tools
for 802.11a/b/g WEP and
WPA cracking. It
implements the best known
cracking algorithms to
recover wireless keys once
enough encrypted packets
have been gathered. The
suite comprises over a dozen
discrete tools, including
airodump (an 802.11 packet
capture program), aireplay
(an 802.11 packet injection
program), aircrack (static
WEP and WPA-PSK
cracking), and airdecap
(decrypts WEP/WPA
capture files).



Wfuzz
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MSSQL Brutter (FastTrack)
MSSQL Bruter is a
Fast-track tool that tries
to identify SQL servers
with weak "sa"
passwords in order to
inject payloads into the
system. The tool
implements this task by
brute forcing the SQL
server password.
http://www.offensiv
esecurity.com/metas
ploitunleashed/MSSQL_B
ruter

SQL Pawnage (FastTrack)
Scans SQL web
applications for
vulnerabilities.
Source:http://www.offe
nsivesecurity.com/metasploit
-unleashed/
MSSQL Injection
(Fast-Track)
A tool that uses SQL
techniques in order to
ultimately gain full
unrestricted access to
the underlying system.
http://www.offensivese
curity.com/metasploitunleashed/

UCSniff
UCSniff is a VoIP & IP
Video Security Assessment
tool that integrates existing
open source software into
several useful features,
allowing VoIP and IP Video
owners and security
professionals to rapidly test
for the threat of unauthorized
VoIP and Video
Eavesdropping. UCSniff
supports Arp poisoning,
VLAN Hopping, VLAN
Discovery via CDP, it has a
sniffer capabilities and more.
UCSniff can operate in 2
modes:
1) Monitor mode – Should
be used on a shared media
where the IP phones
connected to i.e. a HUB,
wireless access point, it can
be also be used in a switched
environment by setting up a
SPAN sessions on a Cisco
switch.
2) Man in the middle mode –
This mode has 2 additional
modes which are
 Learning Mode
 Targeted Mode
http://sourceforge.net/project
s/ucsniff/files/







SQL Pawnage







Skipfish [20]

Skipfish is an active web
application security
reconnaissance tool. It
prepares an interactive
sitemap for the targeted site
by carrying out a recursive
crawl and dictionary-based
probes. The resulting map is
then annotated with the
output from a number of
active (but hopefully nondisruptive) security checks.
The final report generated by
the tool is meant to serve as
a foundation for professional
web application security
assessments.
Source:
http://code.google.com/p/ski
pfish/

Table 1-2 Open Source Tools Survey
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From the open source survey table above, we can infer the best choice tools
for the open source toolkit would be:


OpenVas 4: A vulnerability analysis tool that can scan multiple targets
concurrently with its supported 20,000 vulnerability test. In addition, the tool
consolidates many tools into its scanner (i.e. Nikto, Nmap, and w3af),
expanding its reporting capabilities. [10]



Kismet: A wireless network detector, sniffer, and intrusion detection system
that can sniff 802.11b, 802.11a, 802.11g, and 802.11n traffic. Kismet works
by passively collecting packets; which can lead to detecting hidden networks
over time. [11]



Aircrack: A tool designed to assess the security of a wireless network using
various WEP and WPA cracking algorithms. Once this tool has captured
enough packets from a wireless network, it can begin analyzing those packets
and try to break the wireless network’s encryption methods [12].



UCSniff: An application to rapidly test for the threat of unauthorized VoIP and
Video Eavesdropping. This tool was developed for current and next
generation VOIP infrastructures, so it will aid healthcare entities keep their
HIS HIPAA compliant. [13]



SQLMAP: A tool designed to automate the process of detecting and exploiting
SQL injection flaws and taking over database servers. Not only can the tool
fingerprint databases and fetch data from them, but it can also be used to
execute command on the operating system. [14]



Fast-Track: An automated penetration suite designed to scan and penetrate
databases, networks, infrastructure, and applications of an information
system's network. Some of its various tools include the Nmap scripting
engine, SQL Pawnage, and MSSQL injection. [15]



Wapiti: A tool designed to audit the security of web applications through
'black-box' scans looking for scripts and forms where it can inject data. Some
of its capabilities include Cross Site Scripting injection, LDAP injections, and
file handling errors. [16]

Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2015
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These tools working cohesively, in a toolkit, will address the concerns of
developing a toolkit that will be comprehensive enough to ensure a Health
Information System (HIS) stays HIPAA compliant.

4. Risk Assessment Framework
The purpose of this section is to offer a framework for describing how the
assessment engine (the derrived tool set) interacts with our data set (a replica
healthcare information system).

Figure 1: Risk Assessment Framework for a HIS

The framework is illustrated in figure 1. After the assessment engines have
received data from the HIS components, it pipes their data to the master
assessment engine. Here at the master assessment engine, an analysis and
detection engine analyzes the data to detect anomalies and vulnerabilities within
the HIS. Once the analysis is complete and there are vulnerabilities detected, it
will send its analysis to the mitigation engine. The mitigation engine then
develops mitigation strategies from the analysis and sends its recommendations

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj/vol4/iss1/6
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back to the assessment engine. Finally, the assessment engine presents
assessments to the user in the form of reports.

5. Experimental Setup
The environment we chose to implement our open source tool set was Backtrack
5 configured as a Virtual Machine (VM). We chose this environment simply
because six of the seven tools were already installed in this Linux operating
system. Once we configured the VM, we installed Nessus HomeFeed (version 5).
In this way any custom scan polices will serve as the baseline for testing our open
source solution. Afterwards, when we completed and tested our open source tool
set, we could then compare the results with the Nessus Homefeed results.
Additionally, to develop the open source tool set, we subdivided the HIS domain
into 4 areas. The tool set focuses on the 1) network, 2) databases, 3) applications,
and 4) infrastructure of a HIS.

Figure 2: Assessment Engine

In the following 4 subsections, the paper discusses how each open source tool
surveyed will enable the derived toolkit to achieve its objective. Together, these
tools integrated into a toolkit have the potential to provide comprehensive,
automated assessments for any healthcare organization.


Network: In order to ensure the toolkit was comprehensive enough to provide
detailed network assessments, four tools were selected to determine the

Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2015
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associated risk of exploitation to a HIS’s network. The first tool, OpenVAS 4,
is a network scanner that audits network host and list the vulnerabilities and
common misconfigurations that affect the host. The second tool Kismet, is a
tool that was selected based on its capabilities to detect and sniff out wireless
networks. However, the tool did not provide Wireless network penetration
testing; Therefore, Aircrack was needed to deliver WEP and WPA penetration
testing. Lastly, the toolkit needed to test for unauthorized VOIP
eavesdropping. To provide this type of assessment, UCSniff was preferred as
it can quickly test for unauthorized VOIP eavesdropping.


Database: To assess the security of a HIS’s database, two tools were chosen,
SQLMap and Fast-Track. Both tools provide penetration testing against
databases. However, each tool excelled at one area of database scanning and
penetration testing whereas the other tool excelled in another area of database
scanning and penetration testing. First, SQLMAP excels at fingerprinting a
database, a feature that Fast-Track lacks. The tool can also be a means of
taking over back-end database servers and even access the underlying OS. On
the other hand, Fast-track is an automated penetration suite that uses
Metasploit to enhance its library of attacks against a given database. By
pipelining the fingerprinting results of SQLMap into Fast-Track, we can fully
assess the security of a database.



Applications: The tool chosen to scan for web applications within a HIS was
Wapiti. This tool was chosen because it is able to detect the most vulnerability
(i.e. Cross-Site Scripting, LDAP injection) and act like a fuzzer to inject
payloads to see if scripts within web applications are vulnerable.



Infrastructure: To assess the configuration reviews of the servers and desktop
host on a HIS, there was only one open source option available - OpenVAS 4.
Using server configuration reviews from the scan, we can pipeline the results
into Fast-Track and create automated penetration test against a HIS.

Figure 2 illustrates the synergy of the tools chosen to be integrated into the
tool set. Together, these tools make up the framework for the assessment engine.
As one can see, the tools within the tool set are in constant communication with
the apparatuses of the HIS. If the assessment engine detects malicious activity
within the HIS, it will signal the apparatus of the HIS to send data back to it at
shorter time intervals.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj/vol4/iss1/6
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6. Evaluation and Inferences
Dataset: As hinted throughout this paper, our data set will consist of electronic
health data. The data is both real world and emulated data set from Google health
data.

Figure 3: Google Health Record

Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2015
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Generally speaking, a personal health record contains physical and/or mental
information about a patient. To illustrate an electronic personal health record,
figure 3 is a sample electronic Google personal health record from Google’s
healthcare service [17]. This service allowed individuals to create a profile
derived from their individual health records so that they can see the risk and
benefits of the current treatment they are receiving. In this record, we see
individual identifiable information such as the patient’s name, date of birth,
ethnicity, and blood type (information that needs to be protected in order to
prevent unlawful disclosures). In addition, there are five additional fields (along
with their attributes) within the record. The first field, the Wellness field, contains
the patient’s height and weight. The second field, the Problems field, holds
information related to illnesses the patient has been diagnosed with to date. The
third field, the Allergies field, lists the patient’s allergies. The next field, the
Procedures field, details the procedures the patient has undergone. Finally, the
last field, the Immunizations field, lists the immunizations the patient has
received. By the same token, we will test our data on real world electronic health
record data from a HIMMS healthcare organization.
In addition to EHRs, the other major data set used in our research will be the
firewall. More specifically, the configuration of the firewall is important because
it is the first line of defense against hackers. To clarify, the firewall sits between
the Internet and internal healthcare information system, and its main job is to filter
connections based on policies set by the administrators. If a connection is allowed
by the policy, the firewall will allow the connection into the internal HIS, If not
(because of security reasons), then the firewall will drop the connection. Figure 4
illustrates a firewall policy created by an IT professional. In general, a firewall
policy rule works by analyzing the source of an incoming connection, the
destination of the incoming connection, and the type of service running on that
connection. Once the firewall has this information, it checks the information
against the rules set forth by the administrator. If the connection meets the
requirements, then it is allowed into the firewall. If not, then the connection is
denied. As an example, we can take a look at the first row of the firewall
configuration policy illustration. The host 104.4.51.22 is allowed to make a
samba connection to host 10.0.3.78. Likewise, the firewall uses this same process
to deny connections.
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Source
104.4.51.22
206.8.7.88
194.3.6.2
98.5.7.1
23.1.5.87

Destination
10.0.3.78
10.0.3.33
10.0.3.45
10.0.3.91
10.0.3.178

Protocol
Samba
Ssh
ldap
dns
ntp

Action
Allow
Allow
Deny
Allow
Deny

Figure 4: Firewall Configuration Policy

Results: Real world HIMSS 6 Healthcare Dataset:
Our results are based on emulated assessments of a HIS network and an EHR
database. More specifically, The EHR database we are assessing contains 20,000
electronic medical records (EMR) from the HIMMS 6 Healthcare practice.

HIMMS 6 EMR Assessment Results
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94%

Assessment 1
Assessment 2

92%
92%

Assessment 3

90%

Assessment 4

88%
Security Rule
Vulnerabilities
Detected

Privacy Rule
Vulnerabilities
Detected
Figure 5: HIMMS 7 EMR Assessment

Once we finished assessing the network and EMR database, we divided our
results into two categories: privacy vulnerabilities and security vulnerabilities.
Then we compared the vulnerabilities detected by the derived tool set against the
actual number of vulnerabilities in the HIS. For example, there are five actual
vulnerabilities in a HIS we are assessing. Our tool set only detected four
vulnerabilities; therefore, our tool set was 80% effective. If the tool set detected
all five then it is 100% effective. If the tool set detected all five vulnerabilities
plus one, then the tool set detected a false positive. In this case, we will disregard
all false positives since our results only reflect true positives. In Figure 5, we see
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the HIMMS 6 EMR assessment. There were a total of four assessments to detect
vulnerabilities against the Privacy Rule, and four assessments to assess the
vulnerabilities against the Security Rule. Once we completed the four assessments
within each category, we calculated the averages to find the success rate of the
tool set. The average success rate for detecting security vulnerabilities against the
EMR database was 96%. The average success rate for detecting privacy
vulnerabilities against the EMR database was 98%. In Figure 6, we present our
HIMMS 6 network assessment results. The average success rate of security
vulnerabilities detected by the tool set was 98.75%. In addition, the average
percentage of privacy vulnerabilities detected by the tool set was 98.50%.

HIMMS 6 Network Assesment Results
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Figure 6: HIMMS 7 Network Assessment

Results: Emulated Google Health Dataset:
Our results are based on assessments of a D-Link DIR-655 Xtreme N Gigabit
Router (IP address 10.0.0.1), and an ASP.NET web application database (IP
address 10.0.0.60). More specifically, the database records we are assessing
contain sample information about movies. Additionally, once we finished
assessing the network and database, we compared our results to the Nessus
baseline scans. We found the baseline scans for the D-link router (IP address
10.0.01) found 2 vulnerabilities rated high risk on UDP port 2003, one
vulnerability rated medium risk on UDP port 53, and 23 vulnerabilities rated as
low risk. The derived assessment scan detected one high risk vulnerability, one
medium risk, and 12 vulnerabilities rated low risk. Analyzing and comparing
these results, we see the toolkit did not detect the two high risk vulnerabilities
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found in the baseline scans, but it did detect a high risk vulnerability related to
SMNP Agent responding to community names, and one medium risk
vulnerability related to denial of service attacks against TCP services. However,
the medium risk vulnerability detected by the derived toolkit was not the same
medium risk vulnerability detected by the baseline assessment.
For the host (IP 10.0.0.60) running the ASP.NET application, we found that
the results were very interesting. The baseline assessment detected three medium
risk vulnerabilities. When we examine the medium risk vulnerabilities further, we
find two medium risk vulnerabilities are associated with the web server certificate
being a self-signed certificate. The X.509 certificate should be signed from a
known trusted public authority. This becomes a concern if the web server was
actually placed on the Internet, then an attacker could initiate a man in the middle
attack by breaking the chain of certificates on the server. The other medium risk
vulnerability found was due to SMB signaling being disabled. This vulnerability
could be exploited through a man-in-the-middle attack against the SMB server. In
comparison, the derived assessment toolkit did not detect the three vulnerabilities
the baseline assessment scan detected. The toolkit found two high risk
vulnerabilities in the ASP.NET web application. One high risk vulnerability
detected was because of a SQL 5.x Unspecified Buffer overflow vulnerability.
This was due to the fact that the ASP.NET application did not perform boundary
checks on user supplied data. According to the data logs, failed exploits can cause
a denial of service on the database. The second high risk vulnerability found was
for a MySQL Multiple Vulnerabilities vulnerability. This could be the direct result
of the buffer overflow detected by the other high risk. As one can see the two
assessments contrast greatly. Upon further research, we found that the baseline
assessment software needs a plugin license to detect vulnerabilities within
databases. The detailed screenshots are in Appendix A.

7. Log Analysis and Mitigating Strategies
Log Analysis Detection:
Because of the ever changing environment electronic information systems are
being utilized in, continuous assessments and adjustments are needed to keep
those systems secured and compliant with regulatory laws. This is very true in
terms of healthcare information systems. In order to provide mitigation to the
vulnerabilities found during scans, we will conduct a review of the logs recorded
during assessments. For this we will use four techniques to review the logs.
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Knowledge based: A technique where the log assessment engine will be
conducting an analysis on the tool set assessment data by comparing it to a
stored knowledge base (a file containing the baseline assessment scans of a
HIS undergoing HIPAA compliance testing) within its engine. It will then
send its analysis to the mitigation engine for recommendations.



Anomaly based: A technique that involves comparing the results from the tool
set assessment data with previously recorded assessment data of the HIS.
From this comparison, this analysis will detect anomalies (e.g. a host is
scanning the network searching for vulnerable host, a host is scanning ports of
other host to find what services are running on them, host attacking another
host) found within the HIS and send its analysis to the mitigation engine.
From these analyses the mitigation engine will provide a means to mitigate the
vulnerabilities found.



Reputation based: This technique involves analyzing the behavior of each
component of an HIS to determine the trustworthiness within the domain of
the HIS. To determine the trustworthiness of a host, the analysis and detection
engine will form its own opinion about the host in question, and incorporate
how other host’s view it’s trustworthiness to form a selected host’s reputation.



Hybrid Based The hybrid technique embraces the previous three techniques
processes for forming analysis on a host. Once it has finished its analysis, it
sends the analysis to the mitigation engine. Because of this technique’s
complexity, it requires more time and resources then the previous techniques.

Mitigating Strategies
To illustrate how mitigation strategies work, we will use the example of an
unencrypted database found within a HIS by our tool set. In this scenario, the
analysis and detection engine has reviewed the logs and discovered the tool set 1)
successfully exploited a database containing EHRs, and 2) the toolkit can search
through the database without limitations. Since the EHRs on the database are
unencrypted, any hacker would be able to exploit the data. The analysis and
detection assessment engine would identify this vulnerability and send its analysis
to the mitigation engine. The mitigation engine would then recommend using a
data encryption solution such that even though the hacker is able to gain access to
the data, it is not able to view the encrypted information without possessing the
correct decryption keys. One such encryption solution is the open source
framework Charm-Crypto [18]. Charm is a framework for rapidly prototyping
advanced cryptosystems. Its library includes public key encryption schemes,

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj/vol4/iss1/6

20

Acharya et al.: A Comprehensive Security Assessment Toolkit for HealthCare Systems

identity-based encryption schemes, attribute-based encryption schemes, digital
signatures, privacy-preserving signatures, commitment schemes, zero-knowledge
proofs, and interactive protocols such as anonymous credential and oblivious
transfer schemes. To conclude, once the tool set has assessed a HIS, we can begin
to provide solutions to mitigate the vulnerabilities.
We reviewed the logs, and provided mitigation strategies to address the high
and medium risk vulnerabilities that we detected. Our mitigation strategies were
based on recommendation from online sources such as us-cert.gov, and
owasp.org. First, examining the router of the network (IP address 10.0.0.1), the 2
high risk vulnerabilities associated with the D-link daemon, it is recommended
that one implement authentication methods to mitigate the Click ‘n Connect
daemon to disallow attackers from gaining control of server functions via the Dlink Daemon. Secondly, for the 1 medium risk vulnerability found on the router
from DNS snooping attacks on the router, we recommend re-configuring of the
DNS to stop this kind of snooping activity. When we took a look at the 1 medium
risk from the derived assessment toolkit results, the TCP Sequence Number
Approximation Reset Denial of Service Vulnerability, we found that it is
recommended that one either implement IPSec (IP Security) to encrypt traffic and
obscure TCP information available to the attacker, implement ingress and egress
filtering to expected addresses, or implement TCP MD5 signature option to verify
and checksum TCP packet carrying BGP data. Finally, regarding the host hosting
the ASP.NET application, the 2 high risk vulnerabilities (buffer overflow), we
recommend implementing Integrating boundary checking in the test application.
8. Conclusions and Future Research Directions
In conclusion, our research achieves the task of fully assessing a healthcare
information system domain. We accomplished this by first comprehensively
assessing the databases, networks, applications, and infrastructure within the HIS
domain, and then automating the comprehensiveness assessments to ensure time
and resource efficiency. Furthermore, automating the comprehensive assessment
ensures no steps would be skipped and that the assessment of the HIS is HIPAA
compliant. Finally, in order for a healthcare entity to maintain its HIPAA
compliance, we see the mitigation engine recommending solutions based on the
data it receives from the analysis and detection engine. Our research was useful in
that it exposed the issues facing the healthcare industry not widely publicized and
makes us think about the entirety of the information healthcare entities possess
that are not entirely secure within their domain. As future research we would like
to test our proposed toolkit on different real world data sets. Additionally, one
can use different EHR formats to test the assessment engine against. Also, we
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would like to develop additional mitigation strategies to ensure security of EHRs
in storage, access and transmission. These efforts will in turn enable the
maintenance of compliance in the HIS.

References
[1] HIMSS Stage 6 Organization, retrieved from
http://www.himss.org/content/files/EMR053007.pdf.
[2] HITECH Act Enforcement Interim Final Rule, retrieved from
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/enforcementrule/hitechenfor
cementifr.html.
[3] Understanding Health Information Privacy, retrieved from
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/index.html.
[4] HIPAA Security Rule, retrieved from
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/securityruleguid
ance.html.
[5] HIPAA Privacy Rule, retrieved from
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/index.html.
[6] Ponemon Institute Study, retrieved from http://www.ponemon.org/news-2/23.
[7] The United States Department of Health and Human Services Breach
Notification Rule,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/breachnotificationrule/breac
htool.html
[8] FDA Safety Communication: Cybersecurity for Medical Devices and Hospital
Networks,
http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/safety/alertsandnotices/ucm356423.htm.
[9] Retina network, retrieved from http://www.eeye.com/products/retina/retinanetwork-scanner.
[10] OpenVAS, retrieved from http://www.openvas.org/.

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/caaurj/vol4/iss1/6

22

Acharya et al.: A Comprehensive Security Assessment Toolkit for HealthCare Systems

[11] What is Kismet, retrieved from http://www.kismetwireless.net/
[12]What is aircrack-ng? retrieved from http://www.aircrack-ng.org/doku.php.
[13] UCSniff, retrieved from http://ucsniff.sourceforge.net/.
[14] SQLMAP: Automatic injection and database takeover tool, retrieved from
http://sqlmap.sourceforge.net/.
[15] Offensive Security Ltd., Fast-Track, retrieved from http://www.offensivesecurity.com/metasploit-unleashed/Fast-Track.
[16] Wapiti: Web application vulnerability scanner/security auditor, 2006,
retrieved from http://wapiti.sourceforge.net/.
[17] Google Health Records, retrieved from
http://www.google.com/intl/en_us/health/about/.
[18] A. J. Akinyele, G. Belvin, C. Garman, M. Pagano, M. Rushanan, P. Martin
and M. Green, Charm: A tool for rapid cryptographic prototyping, retrieved from
http://www.charm-crypto.com/Main.html.

[19] Wfuzz - The web bruteforcer, 2008, retrieved from http://www.edgesecurity.com/wfuzz.php.
[20] Skipfish: Web application security scanner, retrieved from
http://code.google.com/p/skipfish/.

Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2015

23

Colonial Academic Alliance Undergraduate Research Journal, Vol. 4 [2015], Art. 6

Appendix A

Appendix Figure 1: Configuring the Database Assessment Scanner

Appendix Figure 2: Configuring the Infrastructure Scans
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Appendix Figure 3: Configuring the Network Scans

Appendix Figure 4: Configuring the Web Application Scans
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Appendix Figure 5: Baseline Assessment of 10.0.0.0

Appendix Figure 6: Overview Baseline Assessment of 10.0.0.1

Appendix Figure 7: Toolkit Assessment Results of 10.0.0.1
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Appendix Figure 8: Overview Baseline Assessment of 10.0.0.60

Appendix Figure 9: Toolkit Assessment Results of 10.0.0.1
(High Risk Vulnerabilities)
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